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 There are now over six million working age adults in the UK who were born abroad. 
This proportion doubled between 1995 and late 2013: from 8% to 16%. Immigration 
has fallen in previous recessions. This did not happen in the latest downturn.  
 
 European Union (EU) countries account for 28% of the total immigrant stock. New 
inflows of immigrants from the EU are now almost as large as inflows from outside 
the EU. Most EU arrivals are for work-related reasons. Most non-EU arrivals are for 
study-related reasons. 
 
 Immigrants are better educated and younger than their UK-born counterparts, 
especially those from the 15 countries that were members of the EU prior to 2004 (the 
EU15). The most recent immigrants are better educated still. Around 10% of all 
migrants are in full-time education. Immigrants are over-represented in the very high-
skilled and very low-skilled occupations. 
 
 Almost 40% of all immigrants now live in London. Around 60% of the working age 
populations of Brent and Westminster were born overseas compared with less than 
3% of those in Knowsley and Redcar & Cleveland. 
 
 Immigrants do not account for a majority of new jobs. The immigrant share in new 
jobs is – and always has been – broadly the same as the share of immigrants in the 
working age population.  
 
 There can be economic benefits associated with migration, especially to fill gaps in 
the UK labour market – where there are shortages of workers. While there may be 
some small relative wage or employment falls for particular (less skilled) groups, 
there is still little evidence of an overall negative impact on jobs or wages. 
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Introduction 
 
Eighteen years of rising immigration between 1995 and 2013 mean that there are now around 
7.8 million individuals (and 6.1 million adults of working age) living in the UK who were 
born abroad, up from 2.9 million in total (and 2.3 million of working age) in 1979. Over the 
same period, the UK-born population grew from 52 million to 55 million (and from 30.3 
million to 32.4 million of working age). This means that 16% of the UK working age (and 
total) population are immigrants, double the share in early 1995 (see Figure 1A). 
 
The stock of immigrants is affected by both the size of inflows and the duration of stay, 
which in turn is related to the number of outflows of immigrants. According to the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), the inflow rate of immigrants into the UK fell back during the recession 
but has recently been rising again (see Figure 1B). The typical (median) immigrant has lived 
in the UK for 15 years. 
 
One of the reasons that some people favour the idea of the UK withdrawing from the 
European Union (EU) is the desire to restrict immigration. All EU citizens currently have the 
right to work in the UK. The UK was also one of only three countries to allow citizens of the 
‘A8’ East European countries the right to work immediately after EU accession in 2004. 
 
Immigration to the UK from the rest of the EU has recently grown as fast as immigration 
from outside the EU (see Figure 1C). There are now nearly two million migrants from the EU 
resident in the UK.1 
 
The UK government’s target of reducing net migration (the difference between the number of 
people entering the UK and the number of people leaving) to tens of thousands requires either 
a fall in the numbers entering the UK or a rise in the numbers leaving the UK (or both). 
Inflows from outside the EU have fallen in recent years, but this has been offset by rising 
inflows from within the EU. At the same time, emigration from the UK has fallen back in 
recent years, making it harder to achieve a reduction in net migration (see Figure 1D). 
 
The stock of immigrants in the UK is influenced both by the country’s economic performance 
and by its immigration policy relative to other countries. Just as in Canada and Australia, the 
UK has an immigration system that seeks to restrict work-related immigration from outside 
the EU to skilled individuals. This means that the number of arrivals who come from outside 
the EU to study or for family reunion every year exceeds those arriving for work-related 
reasons.  
 
Most immigration from within the EU is for work-related reasons (see Figure 2A). Most 
immigration from outside the EU is for study-related reasons (see Figure 2B). 
 
 
                                                 
1 Comparable figures for the number of UK-born living in the EU are hard to come by. The OECD estimates 
that in 2011 there were at least 1.1 million UK-born individuals living in the rest of the EU 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG). 
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Figure 1A: The percentage of immigrants in the UK’s working age population, second 
quarter of 1975 to fourth quarter of 2013  
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Figure 1B: UK immigrant inflows as a percentage of new immigrants in the working 
age population, 1983-2013 
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Figure 1C: UK immigrant population: EU versus Non-EU 
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Figure 1D: UK immigrant inflows and outflows: EU versus Non-EU 
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Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS) from various years. In Figures 1A and 1C, an immigrant is someone living 
in the UK who was born abroad. In Figure 1B, a new immigrant flow is someone who was born abroad and 
arrived from abroad in the previous 12 months. 
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Which countries do immigrants come from?  
 
Table 1 shows the country of origin of the top five ‘sender’ countries in 2013 for the stock of 
existing immigrants and the flow of new immigrants. The sender countries are much less 
concentrated than in the past. Twenty-five years ago, one third of all immigrants came from 
just two countries: Ireland and India. These two countries now account for just 14% of all 
immigrants. The top three sender countries for the new arrivals to the UK in 2013 were 
India, the United States and Romania.  
 
Table 1: Country of origin of immigrants to the UK (percentage share of migrants in 
brackets) 
Largest senders  1985 2013 
All immigrants   
1 Ireland (16.5%)  India (9.4%)                    750,000 
2 India (13.5%) Poland (8.2%)                 650,000 
3 Pakistan (6.9%) Pakistan (6.0%)               470,000 
4 Jamaica (5.1%) Ireland (5.0%)                 400,000  
5 Germany (4.6%) Germany (4.3%)             340,000 
New immigrants (arrived in last year)  
1 United States (20.6%)  India (9.8%)                      40,000 
2 Ireland (10.6%) United States (6.7%)         28,000 
3 India (5.2%) Romania (6.2%)                26,000 
4 Pakistan (4.1%) Poland (6.1%)                   26,000 
5 Germany (3.9%) China (5.7%)                     25,000 
Source: LFS.  
 
Figure 2A: UK immigrant work-related inflows by area of origin 
 
Source: International Passenger Survey (IPS). Note: A2=Romania, Bulgaria; Old_Comm=USA, Australia, New 
Zealand; New_Comm=India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. 
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Figure 2B: UK immigrant study-related inflows by area of origin 
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Source: IPS. 
 
 
What skills do immigrants have? 
 
Immigrants are, on average, more educated than their UK-born counterparts, and the 
educational attainment gap has been rising over time since more recent immigrants are more 
educated, on average, than earlier immigrants (see Table 2). 
 
While just under half of the UK-born workforce left school at 16 or earlier, fewer than one in 
eight new immigrants – those who arrived in the last year – finished their education by the 
age of 16. Just over one in five UK-born members of the workforce finished education at 21 
or later compared with more than 45% of all immigrants and more than 56% of all new 
immigrants. EU15 migrants are twice as likely to be graduates as the UK-born population. A8 
migrants are also more likely to be graduates than UK-born, but most have intermediate 
levels of education. 
 
Table 2: Education and immigrant status (working age population), 2013 
 Percentage of group with each level of education 
Age finished 
education 
UK-born All immigrants EU15 A8 New 
immigrants 
      
16 or under 44.9 19.7 21.8 13.5 11.9 
17-20 32.0 34.9 31.0 55.7 31.8 
21 or older 23.1 45.4 47.2 30.8 56.3 
Source: LFS. 
 
Education partly determines the occupations and industries in which an individual will work. 
There is a larger share of immigrants than UK-born working in professional occupations. But 
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there are more immigrants in processing and elementary occupations (such as cleaning and 
bar work) than might be expected given their qualifications (see Table 3). While EU15 
migrants are concentrated in the professions, A8 migrants are concentrated in both skilled 
manual and elementary manual occupations. 
 
This occupational mix in both high-skilled and less skilled jobs is reflected in the distribution 
of immigrants across industries. The health, hotel and restaurant sectors employ relatively 
more migrant workers than other sectors, particularly A8 migrants – who are also 
concentrated in manufacturing. EU15 migrants are concentrated in the finance sector. The 
energy and public administration sectors employ relatively fewer migrant workers (see Table 
4). 
 
Table 3: Occupational distribution of immigrants and UK-born, 2013 
 Percentage 
of UK-
born 
Percentage of 
immigrants  
Percentage 
of EU15 
immigrants 
Percentage 
of A8 
immigrants 
Percentage of 
occupation 
who are 
immigrants 
      
Managerial 10.1   9.8  11.1  5.2 12.7  
Professional 19.4  24.5  28.5  6.7 16.0  
Assistant 
professional 
14.3  12.2  16.4  4.9 11.3  
Administrative 10.7   8.0  10.2  3.7 10.1  
Skilled trades 11.1   8.7   6.4 15.9 10.4  
Personal service  9.2  9.9   7.7  7.2 13.8  
Sales  8.4   6.3   5.7  6.8 10.1  
Processing  6.4   6.3   3.0 15.0 12.8  
Elementary   10.5  14.3  10.9 34.7 16.9  
Source: LFS. 
 
Table 4: Industrial distribution of immigrants and UK-born, 2013 
  UK-born Immigrants  EU15   A8  Percentage of 
industry who 
are 
immigrants 
Agriculture 1.0   0.8  0.9  2.6  9.4  
Manufacturing 11.0   9.0  10.6  21.5 13.2  
Energy  1.3   0.5   0.7   0.1  7.5  
Construction  7.5   5.6  4.1  8.6 10.9  
Retail 14.1  11.6   8.0  15.1 13.6  
Hotels and 
restaurants 
 4.6   9.4   9.1  14.2 26.2  
Transport  6.4   7.1   6.9   8.9 17.8  
Finance 17.8  21.5  23.5   15.0 17.0  
Public 
administration 
 6.4  4.5  4.7  1.0  8.4  
Education 10.0   8.0  12.2   3.1 11.6  
Health 13.1  15.9  11.8   6.2 15.6  
Other  6.4  6.0  7.9  3.8 10.1 
Source: LFS. 
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Where do immigrants settle?  
 
While the stock of immigrants has risen in all regions over time, it rose most in London. 
Almost 40% of all immigrants now live in London. Although there is some evidence to 
suggest that new immigrants are more regionally dispersed than in the past, immigrants 
constituted more than one third of London’s population in 2013 (see Figure 3). A8 migrants 
are more regionally dispersed than other immigrants. 
 
The geographical dispersion of immigrant share across local areas is much larger. Around 
60% of the working age populations of Brent and Westminster were born overseas 
compared with less than 3% of the populations of Knowsley and Redcar & Cleveland. 
 
Figure 3: Immigrant share of a region’s population 
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Source: LFS. 
 
Figure 4 compares the numbers of immigrants in each age group with the numbers of UK-
born individuals in the same age group. Most immigrants to the UK arrive as young adults. 
Since the stock of UK immigrants is dominated by recent arrivals, with regard to the adult 
population there is clearly most population pressure among adults in their late twenties and 
early thirties, though this matters less if immigrants or native-born workers are substitutes 
across all age groups. 
 
This age pattern also means that many immigrants are likely to be parents of young 
children. It is difficult to obtain information on numbers of children born to immigrant 
adults. The LFS suggests that in 2013, 30% of the 700,000 children under the age of 1 
were born to a household whose head or partner was born overseas. In 1996 – a point at 
which immigration was static and so not dominated as much by new migrants – the 
equivalent share, of a similar number of newborns, was around 14%. 
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Figure 4: Numbers of immigrants by age group, 2013 
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Source: LFS 
 
 
The labour market costs and benefits of immigration 
 
If the supply of labour rises, then we might expect this to put downward pressure on wages 
or jobs, in the absence of any offsetting changes in demand. Unlike in the United States, 
where the skill composition of immigrants is tilted towards the less skilled, the skill 
composition of immigrants to the UK is more biased towards skilled workers. It might be 
expected then that any pressure on wages or jobs would be among skilled workers in the 
UK, unless immigrants look for jobs that are not commensurate with their skills or it is 
harder to transfer certain acquired skills from one country to another. But if demand for 
labour is rising, there may be no effects of immigration on wages and employment. An open 
economy may also adjust by means other than wages: one such mechanism is adjustment by 
changing the mix of goods that the economy produces. 
 
If labour demand exceeds labour supply in the receiving country, the impact of immigration 
will be different from that in a country already at full employment. Concerns about 
substitution and displacement of the UK-born workforce become more prevalent when output 
is demand-constrained, as in a recession or when capital is less mobile.  
 
Empirical research on the labour market effects of immigration to the UK finds little 
evidence of overall adverse effects of immigration on wages and employment for people 
born in the UK. Most of these studies were carried out before the downturn, and there has 
been little new work since. 
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Nevertheless, there may be some downward pressure in the low wage labour market where 
(despite their higher relative education levels) many new immigrants tend to find work. There 
may also be a positive effect on wages in the high wage labour markets where it may take 
more time for the skills that immigrants bring to transfer. 
 
The evidence from research shows that: 
 
1) Immigrants and native-born workers are not close substitutes, on average (existing 
migrants are closer substitutes for new migrants). This means that native-born workers are, 
on average, cushioned from rises in supply caused by rising immigration (Manacorda et al, 
2007). 
 
2) The less skilled are closer substitutes for immigrants than the more highly skilled, so any 
pressures from increased competition from jobs is more likely to be found among less skilled 
workers (Manacorda et al, 2007). These effects appear to be borne out by other studies, but 
the effects are not large (Dustmann et al, 2013a; Nickell and Salaheen, 2008). 
 
3) There is no evidence that EU migrants affect the labour market performance of native-born 
workers (Lemos and Portes, 2008; Goujard et al, 2011). 
 
Figure 5: Immigrant share in new jobs 
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Source: LFS. 
 
 
Immigrants and new jobs 
 
It is sometime said that immigrants account for a majority of all the new jobs generated. This 
is based on a misinterpretation of aggregate data. In times when the population is rising, the 
number of immigrants will grow alongside the numbers in employment (it would be just the 
same if the number of women in the population increased). 
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Figure 5 shows that the actual immigrant share in new jobs (the share of immigrants in jobs 
that have lasted less than three months) is – and always has been – broadly the same as the 
share of immigrants in the working age population. (It is a little higher partly because 
immigrants tend to be younger and job turnover is higher among the young.) 
 
Figure 6 shows the lack of correlation between changes in the native-born youth 
unemployment rate and changes in the share of immigrants living in a local authority area 
between 2004 and 2010. Local authorities that experienced the largest rises in immigrants 
experienced smaller rises in youth unemployment.  
 
Figure 6: Youth unemployment and changes in immigration, 2004-10 
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Source: LFS. 
 
There is also now very little difference between the unemployment rates of immigrant and 
UK-born men. Historically, the employment gap has widened in recessions and narrowed in 
economic recoveries. This did not happen during the latest recession, particularly among 
men. Unemployment rates for immigrants and UK-born rose and then fell back by similar 
amounts (see Figure 7). Unemployment rates for female immigrants, however, remain higher 
than among UK-born women. 
 
The higher average unemployment rate of immigrants in the past was explained in part by a 
relative lack of skills and the fact that many of them were employed in insecure jobs: anyone 
who is in this sort of job faces much higher risks of subsequent unemployment.  
 
Changes in the skill mix of immigrants over time can explain the convergence in 
unemployment rates (though immigrants remain, on average, more likely to be unemployed 
given their qualifications). New immigrants cannot claim state benefits unless they are 
working or have paid sufficient contributions when in work.  
 
Among women, there are much lower employment rates for some immigrant communities 
compared with UK-born women. Age and education can account for around one quarter of 
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these differences among women born in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but more research is 
needed to understand the reasons for these differences. 
 
Figure 7: Unemployment for immigrants and UK-born men and women 
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Source: LFS. 
 
 
Other issues 
 
The labour market is just one area in which rising immigration could have important effects, 
though there are many others, such as the public services like health (Wadsworth, 2013) or 
schools (Geay et al, 2013), housing (Battiston et al, 2013; Sa, 2011) and crime (Bell et al, 
2013). We know much less about these issues than we do about the labour market, but there 
is the beginning of a UK research literature on these important issues and the interested 
reader can consult these references. 
 
Broadly speaking, there is no evidence that immigration has large, harmful effects on any of 
these outcomes. On the public finances, immigrants, if they are younger and in work, tend to 
demand and use fewer public services and are more likely to contribute tax revenue 
(Dustmann et al, 2013b). This is particularly so for EU immigrants and recent arrivals from 
outside the EU. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
During periods of strong economic growth, migration is and has always been important for 
filling gaps in the labour market. On balance, the evidence for the UK labour market suggests 
that fears about adverse consequences of rising immigration in general and EU immigration 
in particular have still not, on average, materialised. It is hard to find evidence of much 
displacement of UK workers or lower wages, on average. Immigrants, especially in recent 
years, tend to be younger and better educated than the UK-born and less likely to be 
unemployed. 
 
But there have been some effects. The less skilled may have experienced greater downward 
pressure on wages and greater competition for jobs than others, but these effects still appear 
to have been small. Unfortunately, we do not know much about whether the effects of 
immigration are different in downturns. We also need to understand more about how capital 
and sectoral shifts in demand respond to immigration over the longer run. 
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Future migration trends will, as ever, depend on relative economic performance and 
opportunity. But we still need to know more about the effects of rising immigration beyond 
the labour market in such areas as prices, health, crime and welfare.  
 
 
May 2014 
 
 
For further information, contact: 
Jonathan Wadsworth: j.wadsworth@lse.ac.uk  
Or Romesh Vaitilingam: romesh@vaitilingam.com 
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